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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: M5/0012/84

30 March 1984

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: DCI Request for Ideas on Unauthorized Disclosure Problem

1. (C) On 27 March, [ ] called us about the DCI's urgent request for a "quick and intensive review of what can be done to attack the leak problem" in every possible way including administratively and through legislation.

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2. (C) I believe that the SECOM leak study, now in its final stage, is very important to this issue. It will give the DCI an analytic tool and detailed historic data for discussion with Congress and the White House. Perhaps it will suggest ways to attack the problem, i.e., by showing that certain categories of information and certain types of reports are most often leaked. Maybe we can then focus our defensive and investigative efforts.

3. (C) I suggest that you remind the DCI about the Jack Anderson - National Intelligence Daily (NID) case. Our Office of General Counsel says it's a dead issue - no prosecution or civil action is now contemplated. But it is illustrative of possible lack of seriousness of purpose in dealing with the unauthorized disclosure problem. As I understood it the NIDs were, essentially, stolen and sold. At least Jack Anderson has them, illegally, in his possession. But nothing was done. I'm sure you can appreciate what I am leading up to: is investigation, detection of the culprit(s) and prosecution, a worthwhile way to "attack the leak problem?" Or, are defensive and educational means the only way left?

4. (U) Here are a few more ideas (which depend partly on what the SECOM leaks study shows):

a. (C) Intensively investigate one leak (or group of leaks) which can be reasonably isolated to a particular document or meeting and which involve higher level persons. If this is successful, have the culprit fired by the highest level official possible, e.g., the President. Put the facts on the public record.

b. (C) The DCI could issue new rules on dissemination of certain types of intelligence information. This might require White House assistance.

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c. (C) Require the reindoctrination of all high level government/military personnel. The reindoctrinations would have to be completed by a certain date, would not be pro forma and would use real and recent examples of the damage done by leaks. Again, White House intervention probably necessary.

d. (U) Make full use of the remaining sections of NSDD-84 (partially done in the above recommendations) - especially the establishment of policies about media contacts.

e. (S) If such examples and circumstances exist, have the FBI and CIA go public with a good case(s) concerning a media type who's working with the Soviets. Or perhaps there is a recent defector who could publicly describe how the Soviets depend on leaks in their intelligence analysis and countermeasures.

5. (U) This is the best we can do in this often-plowed field. The above suggestions are mine - there wasn't time for discussion and coordination elsewhere in NSA.

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